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6.1 Introduction
Foreign direct investment (FDI) in the United States and U.S. direct
investment abroad (DIA) are important economic phenomena as well
as a source of political controversy. In 1980, FDI reached $17 billion,
about 22% as large as net domestic fixed investment. Correspondingly,
DIA reached $19 billion, about 25% as large as net domestic investment
in plant and equipment. Since 1980, substantial FDI has continued,
whereas DIA has fallen precipitously. Further, the sources of finance
for FDI and the uses of earnings on DIA have changed dramatically in
the past few years.
These flows—in both directions—have become a concern of tax pol-
icy. For example, the adoption of the Accelerated Cost Recovery Sys-
tem (ACRS) in 1981, as amended in 1982, was expressly limited to
investment in the United States. While the primary motivation behind
ACRS was to increase U.S. domestic capital formation, a secondary
concern, evidenced in the hearings preceding its adoption, was to stem
the flow of U.S. investment abroad. Further, FDI is often seen as an
important justification for continuing the U.S. corporate income tax,
even by those who favor corporate and personal tax integration. An-
other example of revenue (and perhaps location of investment) concern
is the per country limitation to the foreign tax credit in the adminis-
tration's tax reform proposal.
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Multinational firms undoubtedly invest outside their home country
for a wide variety of reasons: access to markets, political considera-
tions, labor costs, proximity to suppliers, and expected economic con-
ditions, to name a few. Often, the reasons may be industry-, firm-, or
even product-specific. Given these other forces shaping the interna-
tional location of investment, however, tax laws potentially affect the
attractiveness of U.S. direct investment abroad and foreign direct in-
vestment in the U.S., as well as the repatriation of earnings and/or
capital. The major changes in U.S. domestic investment incentives
enacted in 1981 and 1982 (ERTA and TEFRA, respectively) combined
with the trends in FDI and DIA, as well as current tax reform proposals
which might affect tax rates on DIA and FDI substantially, lead us to
reexamine the question of the extent to which tax policy appears to
influence the international location of investment.
We begin in section 6.2 with a brief literature review, focusing on
the differing effects on the location of investment of tax policy toward
domestic investment and toward foreign source income. The argument
in Hartman (1981,1984, 1985)—that foreign investment financed by re-
tained earnings should not be influenced by the (deferred) home country
tax on foreign source income—is presented and some caveats suggested.
Section 6.3 presents a description of recent trends in FDI and DIA,
their sources of finance and their uses, as well as their industrial com-
position and origin or location, respectively. It also describes the data
used in our study.
Section 6.4 presents our empirical results. First, for the period 1965-
79, we compare our results using revised data to those of Hartman.
The results are fairly robust to the data revisions. Next, for both FDI
and DIA we use revised data on extended sample periods and several
alternative functional forms and combinations of variables to test the
impact of tax policy on FDI and DIA. We conclude that tax policy can
have significant effects on the international location of investment. Our
results are similar to the quantitative estimates in Hartman's several
studies for some of the effects, but they are only about one-third to
one-half as large for others, for example, the impact of U.S. domestic
tax policy on U.S. direct investment abroad.
Section 6.5 presents a brief summary and conclusion, including rough
estimates of the likely impacts of recent tax policy and current pro-
posals on the international location of investment, and an analysis of
the welfare effects of taxation of FDI and DIA.
6.2 A Brief Review of the Literature
The effects of domestic tax policy on the international location of
investment occur primarily through two channels: home country tax203 The Effects of Tax Policy on the International Location of Investment
policy toward investment in the home country and home country tax
policy toward foreign source income.
1
Domestic tax policy toward investments made in the home country
affects both FDI in the home country and DIA by home country firms.
This occurs because tax policy alters the relative rates of return avail-
able at home and abroad. Entrepreneurs investing capital will naturally
be attracted to locations where the (risk-adjusted) rate of return is
highest.
2 Of course, this channel hinges on the substitutability of foreign
and domestic investment for a firm. However, the common conception
of foreign and domestic investment as alternative methods of producing
the same good and/or serving the same (geographic) market suggests
that there is some substitution between locations of investment. More-
over, as discussed in Hartman (1981), if there are financial constraints
on firms, there will be a clear tradeoff between foreign and domestic
operations. Thus, there are good theoretical reasons for domestic tax
policy to affect both FDI and DIA through its effects on relative rates
of return. Empirically, this view has been supported by results in Hart-
man (1981, 1984) and below.
The importance of taxes on foreign source income has long been a
subject of debate. There are two major approaches to taxation of foreign
source income. In the "territorial" approach, the company pays no
home country taxes on foreign income. In the "residence" approach,
the company does pay home country taxes, but often a credit or de-
duction is allowed for taxes paid in the host country. The United States
taxes with the residence approach, but allows a credit for taxes paid
to other countries.
Research in the 1960s and 1970s focused largely on the issue of
"capital export neutrality," the equivalent tax treatment of the foreign
and domestic returns of multinational companies. In this regard, it was
argued that, under a residential system with a credit for foreign taxes,
the ability to defer taxation on foreign source income conferred a tax
advantage toward investment abroad.
3
This view has been challenged by Hartman (1981, 1984, 1985). Hart-
man properly draws attention to the distinction between investment
financed out of retained earnings abroad and investment financed by
transfers from home. If the subsidiary is investing out of retained earn-
ings, the home country tax on foreign source income does not affect
the marginal investment decision, because the repatriation of earnings,
not the earnings themselves, are the tax base. The home country tax
on foreign source income is unavoidable, and its present value does
not depend on the length of deferral. Thus, the marginal investment
decision for investment out of retained earnings should depend only
on net returns available in the home country or the host country. Hart-
man calls this "capital import neutrality," that is, the same tax rates204 Michael J. Boskin and William G. Gale
influence the decisions of both U.S. firms in the U.S. and foreign firms
in the U.S. that finance investment by retained earnings.
4
For firms that finance foreign investment by transfers from home,
the home country tax on foreign source income does matter because
no foreign earnings have accrued and thus the tax on foreign source
income is avoidable. One implication of this theory is that a foreign
affiliate should never simultaneously repatriate earnings and draw funds
from home, since this creates a completely avoidable tax liability. Hart-
man defines firms that finance foreign investment by retention of earn-
ings as "mature" firms, those that finance investment by transfers from
home as "immature." He argues that a large part of U.S. DIA is
undertaken by mature firms, since approximately 70% of DIA in 1975—
79 was financed by retained earnings. Thus, he concludes, "the size
of the U.S. tax burden on foreign source income should be irrelevant
for investment decisions" (1985, p. 119).
Several caveats apply to this conclusion. First, it should be noted
that neither we nor Hartman test this proposition. Second, in recent
years DIA financed by retained earnings has risen while DIA has fallen,
suggesting a reexamination of the issues. Third, domestic treatment of
foreign source income will not matter for timing of repatriation only if
the domestic tax rate is known and thought to be permanent. If major
tax policy revisions occur frequently (as in fact they have), then a firm
will have an incentive to wait for lower rates.
6.3 Data
6.3.1 Introduction
Foreign direct investment refers to the infusion of funds into a U.S.
subsidiary by the foreign parent or the retention of earnings by that
subsidiary. The Bureau of Economic Analysis defines a U.S. affiliate
as "a U.S. business enterprise in which a foreign person owns or
controls, directly or indirectly, at least 10% of the voting securities if
an incorporated U.S. business enterprise or an equivalent interest if
an unincorporated business enterprise."
5 U.S. direct investment abroad
is defined equivalently for the foreign subsidiaries of U.S. parent
companies.
6
Two aspects of this definition merit comment. First, foreign direct
investment and direct investment abroad are not necessarily the dom-
inant aspects of international capital flows. As of the end of year 1984,
foreign direct investment in the United States accounted for approxi-
mately 18% of all foreign assets in the United States, while U.S. direct
investment abroad represented 25% of U.S. assets abroad (Scholl 1985).
Second, foreign direct investment is not the exact counterpart to
domestic net investment figures. For example, inflows of funds (or205 The Effects of Tax Policy on the International Location of Investment
retention of earnings) are not necessarily used to purchase real capital
assets, so FDI may overstate real foreign net investment. On the other
hand, U.S. borrowing by the U.S. subsidiary is not part of the cal-
culation of FDI. Hartman (1984) suggests that it is reasonable to use
FDI figures as net foreign investment. Hartman (1981) shows that an
equivalent proposition also holds for U.S. direct investment abroad.
6.3.2 Trends
Summary data for foreign direct investment in the United States and
U.S. direct investment abroad are presented in tables 6.1, 6.2, and 6.3.
As shown in table 6.1, foreign direct investment has grown 2000%












































































































Source: Foreign direct investment and its components: U.S. Department of Commerce,
Bureau of Economic Analysis, 1984, and various issues of Survey of Current Business.
Nonresidential net investment: Economic Report of the President, 1985, table B-15, p.
250. Values of GNP deflator are 1950:53.56, 1960:68.70, 1970:91.45, 1980:178.42,
1984:223.38.
aForeign direct investment is financed either by retention of earnings or by intercompany
flows of equity or debt. Retained earnings are negative when divident payments to equity
holders are larger than earnings. Intercompany flows are net figures and are negative
when more funds flow out of the U.S. subsidiary than into it. Thus, the ratio listed above
may be greater than 100% or less than 0. In 1982, retained earnings were negative.
bThis ratio measures FDI financed by retained earnings divided by FDI income. It can
be negative for the reasons stated in note a.206 Michael J. Boskin and William G. Gale
third of this period, with tremendous growth from 1977 to 1981, a
collapse of 50% in 1982 and 1983, and a doubling in 1984. FDI figures
are also large in relative terms. In every year since 1980, FDI has been
more than 20% of U.S. nonresidential net investment in plant and
equipment. This is especially noteworthy for 1984, because net in-
vestment in the U.S. rose by over 100% of its 1983 level. The com-
position of the sources of FDI has changed over time. Since 1977, the
percentage of FDI financed by retained earnings has fallen substantially.
This has occurred contemporaneously with the large rise in FDI doc-
umented in column 1, thus suggesting that investment financed by
intercompany debt and equity flows has dominated FDI in recent years.
Finally, column 4 shows that the reinvestment ratio for FDI income
has also fallen since 1982, though it was relatively stable in earlier
periods.
U.S. direct investment abroad, shown in table 6.2, grew steadily
through 1979 but has since collapsed, representing a large and con-
tinuing repatriation of funds to the U.S. Real DIA in 1984 is only 2%
higher than it was in 1950. These notions are reinforced by examination
of DIA as a percentage of U.S. nonresidential net investment. DIA
was consistently 20% or more of net investment in the 1960s and 1970s
but has collapsed to 11% or less since 1981. The composition of DIA
finance, shown in column 3, has undergone extreme gyrations in recent
years. Nevertheless, the reinvestment ratio for DIA income has re-
mained relatively stable.
Table 6.3 provides a snapshot of the level and composition of the
U.S. positions in FDI and DIA as of the end of 1984. Both FDI and
DIA have accumulated substantial positions. Approximately one-third
of the FDI position is in manufacturing and one-sixth in petroleum.
These two industries also account for 40% and 25% of the DIA position,
respectively. Not surprisingly, European countries account for the larg-
est share of both positions. Although Japan accounts for only 9.3% of
the FDI position, it should be noted that this figure has risen from 2.1%
in 1975 and 6.4% in 1979. Moreover, as noted above, capital inflows
may occur predominantly in forms other than FDI.
Thus, even a cursory examination of the data suggests that both FDI
and DIA can be substantial. The wide swings suggest further that
international investment flows may be very sensitive to current or
anticipated conditions. Before proceeding to a more formal analysis,
however, issues concerning the data should be noted.
6.3.3 Sources
All data on FDI and DIA have been obtained from either Selected
Data on Foreign Direct Investment in the United States, 1950-79;








































































































Source: Direct investment abroad and its components: U.S. Department of Commerce,
Bureau of Economic Analysis, (1983b), and various issues of Survey of Current Business.
aSee note a table 6.1. In 1982, DIA financed by retained earnings was positive, but DIA
financed by transfers was negative and larger in absolute value.
bSee note b, table 6.1.





































Source: Survey of Current Business, August 1985, pp. 30, 36, 47.208 Michael J. Boskin and William G. Gale
annual surveys of these topics in the Survey of Current Business, all
of which are publications of the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA).
BE A develops these series by conducting occasional benchmark sur-
veys of virtually all firms involved in FDI or DIA. They construct
between year data by conducting annual sample surveys and extrap-
olating the total figures based on the firms in the sample surveys and
the previous benchmark survey. Thus, as the time since the latest
benchmark survey increases, the chance of misestimation would seem
to increase. BEA conducted DIA benchmark surveys in 1966, 1977,
and 1982. FDI surveys were undertaken in 1974 and 1980.
The 1980 FDI survey in particular generated substantial revisions in
data for 1980 and later dates. For example, the direct investment po-
sition in FDI was revised upward by 21%, capital inflows (i.e., foreign
direct investment) were revised upward by 24%, and FDI income was
revised downward by 9% (Belli 1984). With these revised data for 1980,
the direct investment position rose 52% from its 1979 value, and FDI
was 42% higher than in 1979. Note that BEA did not revise the data
from the 1970s based on the 1980 benchmark survey.
There is reason to believe that a substantial part of the abrupt jumps
in these series is due to underreporting during the 1970s. Specifically,
BEA estimates that about 75% of the revision in the capital inflows
figure was accounted for by affiliates that should have reported in the
annual sample surveys but did not.
7
One additional concern is that through 1979 BEA collected retained
earnings for incorporated affiliates only. In 1980, unincorporated affil-
iates began to report retained earnings too. Thus, the series "invest-
ment financed by retained earnings" (Ire below) refers to incorporated
affiliates only through 1979, and all affiliates in 1980 and thereafter.
BEA presented separate data for incorporated and unincorporated af-
filiates for 1980-83, but has since discontinued the practice.
To account for the problems with the data discussed above, we have
conducted a variety of alternative specifications. The alternatives are
discussed with other regression results in section 6.4.
All tax rate and rate-of-return data have been generously supplied by
Martin Feldstein and Joosung Jun (1986). Data on U.S. gross national
product, actual and middle cycle expansion path, have been taken from
the Economic Report of the President, 1985 and de Leeuw and Hollo way
(1983). Data concerning gross domestic product in OECD countries were
obtained from National Accounts of OECD Countries, 1950-68 and 1950-
78, and OECD Main Economic Indicators in recent years.
6.4 Results
Table 6.4A presents FDI equations for 1965-79 estimated by us and
Hartman (1984). The data that Hartman used were presented in ant
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appendix to that article. Our results use a revised tax rate and rate-of-
return series presented in Feldstein and Jun (1986). Our results with
the original data are very close to Hartman's. With the revised data,
our estimates of the effects of taxes and rates of return are still similar
to Hartman's, especially for the retained earnings equations. For the
equations examining Ire, our estimates show a decline in the elasticities
with respect to foreigners' net return in the U.S., to 0.9 from 1.2 in
the IJY equation, and to 0.8 from 1.0 in the retention ratio equation.
We also find a lower elasticity for the relative tax term.
8 None of the
point estimates changes by more than one standard deviation. We are
thus heartened by the stability of the major qualitative conclusions and
quantitative results for the Ire equations. The results hold up well with
either the original or revised data. The /,/ Y equations seem to be slightly
more sensitive to the data revisions. The f-statistics and relative mag-
nitudes of the coefficients do remain stable, though.
In table 6.4B, we present basic results for DIA in the 1965-79 period.





















































































aDefined as direct investment abroad financed by retained earnings divided by U.S. GNP.
bDefined as overall gross rate of return x (one - the total effective tax rate.)
cDefined as income from direct investment abroad divided by the end-of-year direct
investment position (in DIA) for the previous year.211 The Effects of Tax Policy on the International Location of Investment
own rate of return. The effect is quite strong (the elasticity calculated
at mean values is approximately 1.4) and statistically significant. Our
estimates of the response of DIA to the net return in the United States,
however, are approximately one-third the size of Hartman's. (We es-
timate an elasticity of 0.2, compared to Hartman's 0.66.) Our estimates,
like Hartman's, found that the after-tax return is the relevant measure;
the coefficients on gross return are equal and opposite in sign to the
coefficients on gross return times the total effective tax rate. As with
the net return, Hartman's coefficients are three times as large as ours.
These basic equations appear to fit the data well. Nevertheless, the
data revisions seem to have an important effect on the sensitivity of
DIA to variations in the net-of-tax return in the United States.
In summary, except for the IJY equation for FDI and the elasticity
of DIA with respect to net return in the United States, we obtain results
very similar to Hartman's (1981, 1984), even with revised tax rate and
rate-of-return data.
6.4.1 New Results for Foreign Direct Investment
Tables 6.5A and 6.5B present new results for FDI. In these equations
we extend the sample forward to 1984, and in some cases backward
to 1956, use the revised series mentioned above, and experiment with
a variety of alternative explanatory variables and functional forms.
Estimates can vary substantially depending on the assumptions made.
Table 6.5A presents regressions explaining the log of various foreign
direct investment rates. The second equation shows typical results for
the addition of alternative explanatory variables. In short, the basic
rate-of-return and tax variables seem to contain most of the explanatory
power.
For 1965-84, the elasticity of {IJY) is estimated to be 1.0 with respect
to its own rate of return, 1.9 with respect to the average foreigners'
net return in the United States, and -2.9 with respect to the relative
tax term. Compared to results for 1965-79, the estimates in column 2
show a smaller response to return on FDI, and a much larger response
to foreigners' net return in the United States and relative taxes.
Results are presented for the 1956-84 period, too, in order to dem-
onstrate the sensitivity to sample period. These results imply smaller
elasticities than the results for 1965-79 or 1965-84.
The retention ratio is modeled in columns 3 and 4. We found elas-
ticities for 1956-84 and 1965-84 that bracket the 1965-79 estimates
for foreigners' net return in the United States and relative tax rates.
In each case the elasticity for 1965-84 is largest. The estimates show
a considerable degree of variation. For the return on FDI, the 1965-
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Sources: Middle expansion trend GNP: de Leeuw and Holloway (1983), and subsequent issues
of Survey of Current Business. OECD data: National Accounts of OECD Countries, 1950-68 and
1950-78, and OECD Main Economic Indicators in subsequent years.
aBecause lre is negative in 1982, a constant was added to (Ire x 1000)/GNP before taking logarithms.
The constant = 3,880, chosen such that the minimum (transformed) observation was roughly
equivalent to the minimum (transformed) observation for /,.
bThis variable is as denned on table 6.4A.
cMeasured as U.S. GNP divided by middle expansion trend U.S. GNP.
dMeasured (GDP of all OECD countries - U.S. GDP), divided by its linear trend value.
The equations modeling investment financed by transfers fit poorly,
as was the case in the 1965-79 sample period. Various modifications,
including the addition of output variables, dummies for various periods,
and alternative functional forms do not alter this result.
Turning to other functional forms, table 6.5B presents results for
linear equations in the rate and level of the variables used in table 6.5A.
In general, these equations do not perform as well as the logarithmic
equations. The coefficients have the correct signs and take on reason-
able values. Using mean values over the sample period, the elasticity
of IJY with respect to the return on FDI is 2.0, with respect to for-


































































































Note: All variables have been denned in table 6.4A.
relative tax term is -2.0. Correspondingly, for the retention ratio, the
elasticities for the 1965-84 period are 1.0, 2.3, -4.2, respectively.
Columns 2 and 3 show that, again, regressions extending backward to
1956 do not perform as well. These coefficients imply elasticities rang-
ing from 0.5 to 1.5 for foreigners' net return in the United States, 0.6
to 0.7 for return on FDI, and -1.4 to -2.9 for relative taxes.
We also employed several alternative specifications including a dummy
variable to capture the negative Ire in 1982, instrumental variables to
account for potential endogeneity of the return on FDI, expanding the
values of FDI (by 20%) in the late 1970s to proxy for the underreporting
discussed in section 6.3, and alternative output terms. The overriding
result of these alternative specifications is, as the tables above would
suggest, that the estimates are fairly sensitive to the specifications
made.
6.4.2 New Results for Direct Investment Abroad
Table 6.6 presents some basic extensions of the DIA results given
in table 6.4B. The results are presented only for I*reIY as the other two
equations fit poorly over the entire period. The I*re equations, in rates
and level, tend to confirm strongly our earlier estimates, from table
6.4B. In particular, the net return in the United States enters with an214 Michael J. Boskin and William G. Gale


































a(/*re/F)is DIA financed by retained earnings x 1000 divided by GNP.
bSee table 6.4B for definition.
elasticity of approximately -0.2 in each specification, while the net
return abroad has an elasticity estimated at 1.2 to 1.3. Alternative
specifications led to varying results and are not reported here.
In summary, our empirical research supports the notion that domestic
tax policy can have a significant impact on DIA and FDI. Our results
are similar to Hartman's for 1965-79, although our elasticity estimates
are somewhat smaller for the response of DIA to a change in net returns
in the United States and for the response of FDI to changes in the
return on FDI.
6.5 Summary and Implications
We have presented above new evidence that U.S. domestic tax policy
affects the international location of investment. While the results are
somewhat sensitive to sample period, functional form, and other con-
siderations, the qualitative conclusions tend to hold up well. Of par-
ticular interest are two empirical issues—the likely impact of the 1981—
82 corporate tax changes on FDI and DIA and the corresponding po-
tential effects of any corporate tax reform. Also important are the
welfare aspects of international location of investment.
Our estimates of the impact on DIA of changes in the after-tax rate
of return in the United States suggest that a reduction of approximately
4 cents of DIA occurs for every dollar of increased U.S. domestic
investment. This estimate derives from a comparison of analogous
coefficients on domestic investment equations estimated by Feldstein
and Jun (1986).
9 This refers only to investment out of retained earnings.215 The Effects of Tax Policy on the International Location of Investment
It is likely that transfers from domestic parent companies to foreign
subsidiaries, or the establishment of such subsidiaries, is also respon-
sive to domestic tax policy, but the data are insufficient to reach any
specific conclusions on the matter.
We estimate that a tax policy which raises the after-tax rate of return
enough to lead to a dollar of increased domestic investment in the U.S.
brings with it between 8 and 27 cents of FDI.
1
0 These results are
consistent with those found by Hartman (1981, 1984).
Several studies have attempted to analyze the effect of the 1981-82
investment incentives on effective marginal tax rates (e.g., see Auer-
bach 1983, Feldstein and Jun 1986, Gravelle 1983, and Hulten and
Robertson 1983). These studies generally find that the effective cor-
porate tax rate was reduced by about 20% to 35%.
n With a constant
before-tax rate of return and a pre-ERTA effective tax rate of about
33%, the tax changes increased foreigners' average net return in the
United States by 10% to 17%. Other things equal, our estimates suggest
that this change in net return would bring about approximately a 2%
to 4% decline in DIA and an 11% to 20% rise in FDI. This would imply
capital inflows of about $0.5 billion to $1.0 billion from smaller DIA
and $2 billion to $4 billion in increased FDI. Of course, these figures
refer to FDI and DIA out of retained earnings only. Likewise, a tax
reform such as H.R.3838, which raises (except perhaps at very high
inflation rates) the effective tax rate on U.S. corporate investment,
would result in an increase in direct investment abroad by U.S. firms
and a decrease in foreign direct investment in the United States. How-
ever, because these results contain no long-term dynamic theory of the
optimal international location of investment, they should not be taken
as any final guide to the impact of these tax changes on investment
patterns.
Finally, the welfare economics of the international location of in-
vestment, described in Caves (1982), Goulder, Shoven, and Whalley
(1983), and Hartman (1984) should be addressed. Domestic economic
welfare rises with FDI because the United States receives a claim on
the rate of return to foreign capital through the taxation of FDI income.
Conversely, domestic economic welfare falls when U.S. firms substi-
tute DIA for investment at home,
1
2 because the nation then receives
only the net-of-foreign-tax return (and that only when it is repatriated)
rather than the gross return. These welfare effects are augmented by
the beneficial effects on labor productivity of greater investment—
foreign or domestic—in the United States. Thus, a reduction in taxation
of new corporate investment improves welfare through three channels:
the standard mechanism, through which lowering the effective marginal
tax rate generates new domestic investment opportunities for U.S.
firms; a reallocation of the location of investment by U.S. firms toward216 Michael J. Boskin and William G. Gale
home and away from abroad; and an increase in FDI. In this paper,
we have presented some new evidence that these last two effects are
quantitatively important and therefore that it is necessary to consider
them in any evaluation of domestic investment incentives.
The welfare effects of tax policy clearly depend on the responsive-
ness of FDI and DIA to net-of-tax returns. The welfare gains to a tax
reduction confined to new corporate investment are positively linked
to the responsiveness of DIA and of FDI with respect to net-of-tax
returns in the United States.
Our results suggest that accelerated depreciation or tax credits for
new investment which decrease the effective marginal tax rate paid at
the corporate level by 10% would, through its effect on the net-of-tax
return available to FDI, raise FDI by 9%. Corporate tax revenues from
taxation of FDI could be expected to rise correspondingly. Similar,
though smaller, revenue effects would occur for DIA. These results
refer to investment financed by retained earnings only. Note, however,
that tax revenue is greater per dollar of potential DIA diverted to
domestic investment than per dollar of FDI, because foreign owners
of U.S. capital pay taxes only at the corporate level, while domestic
owners are also responsible for state, local, and personal taxes.
Our results suggest that the tax effects on the international location
of investment are important. Tax policies, such as ACRS and ITC,
which raise the after-tax rate of return on new investment without losing
revenue from previous investment, not only stimulate domestic fixed
investment, but also attract additional investment from abroad. The
additional investment supplements the domestic investment impact on
productivity and raises corporate tax revenue. However, our results
should be taken as preliminary estimates, not as definitive statements
about the long-run impacts of tax policy.
Notes
1. The home country is where the parent company is based.
2. Issues concerning risk adjustment are not addressed in this paper.
3. See Bergsten, Horst, and Moran (1978) or Caves (1982) for a review of
this position.
4. However, even when the tax on foreign source income is not a concern,
it is not the case that foreign firms in the U.S. respond to the same tax rates
as do U.S. firms. Foreign firms care about the tax rate paid at the corporate
level. U.S. firms should respond to the total effective tax rate. These rates are
developed in Feldstein, Dicks-Mireaux, and Poterba (1983) and Feldstein and
Jun (1986). They do not always move in tandem. Moreover, it would be easy217 The Effects of Tax Policy on the International Location of Investment
to design policies that affect the rates differently, e.g., the current tax reform
bill H.R.3838.
5. U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis (1983a),
p. 1. A person is defined to include any individual, associated group, estate,
trust, corporation, or any government.
6. U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis (1981),
p. 2.
7. Belli (1984), p. 34. BEA estimates that all of the revision in capital inflows
was due to underreporting, but 25% of the underreporting was by exempt
affiliates. For the direct investment position, two-thirds of the upward revision
was due to underreporting, one-third due to revision or correction in the sample
data. BEA does not state what part of the underreporting of direct investment
position should have been reported, but if (as for capital inflows) 75% of the
underreporting should have been reported, then one-half (2/3 x 3/4) of the
upward revision in direct investment position should have been reported in
the sample survey. This suggests that the position in FDI was also substantially
underreported in the 1970s.
8. The relative tax term is meant to capture differences between domestic
saving incentives and investment incentives. Thus, a savings incentive that
lowered t' but not t would then increase savings, lower the pretax rate of return
and thus lead to a fall in FDI.
9. This estimate is obtained as follows. Feldstein and Jun (1986) regress net
investment divided by GNP on several variables, including the (lagged) overall
net rate of return. Their coefficient on the rate-of-return variable is .459. When
our equations are transformed into the appropriate units (i.e., when coefficients
are divided by 1000; see note in table 6.6), our estimate of the effect of net
rate of return in the United States on U.S. direct investment abroad is - .016,
which is about 4% as large (in absolute value) as .459.
10. This is obtained by multiplying the elasticity of IJY with respect to
foreigners' net return in the United States (shown in cols. 1 and 2, table 6.5A)
by the average value of foreigners' net return in the United States (.054) and
dividing by the average of the (transformed) IJY (.00355).
11. Studies differ in their estimates because of differing assumptions about
expected inflation, discount rates, debt/equity ratios, and hurdle rates, among
other things.
12. Of course, not all DIA comes at the expense of domestic investment.
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Comment David G. Hartman
Being one of the few researchers active in what I regard as an extremely
important field—tax policy and foreign investment—I can only applaud
this effort by Boskin and Gale. At the same time, I feel as if I should
express sympathy for them, upon their entry into an area in which
evidence is sparse, the available information is often unreliable, and
the reliable statistics are often unrelated to the concepts one would
expect and hope to be measuring.
That said, let me also indicate that the nature of this paper makes a
critical review very difficult. Boskin and Gale, as they have indicated,
set out to replicate and then extend several pieces of empirical work
I have published over the past several years. Given the severe data
problems to which I have alluded, it is particularly appropriate to have
other researchers test the same basic model, using "a variety of alter-
native explanatory variables, functional forms, and sample periods."
I can hardly be critical of the authors' methodology without dragging
skeletons out of my own closet; and, since "the qualitative conclusions
tend to hold up well" under this scrutiny, I likewise have little dis-
agreement with the conclusions.
It is highly encouraging that my somewhat tentative conclusions on
the effects of tax policy on U.S. investment abroad and foreign in-
vestment in the United States are confirmed when information from
the 1980s is combined with the evidence I examined. In a way it is also
surprising to me. Indeed, there were several reasons for my having
ended my period of study of these phenomena with 1979.
First, foreign direct investment in the United States has surged in
this decade, as table 6.1 indicates. Increasing integration of the world's
capital markets, in general, is a feature of the 1980s which is apparent
to all. We also know, as a number of the other chapters in this book
make explicit, that the 1981 tax reforms in the United States provided
a basic structural change in the incentives for investment. My reluc-
tance to use data from the 1980s was based on the fear that these two
factors would conspire to produce inflated estimates of tax effects.
David G. Hartman is chief international economist at Data Resources, and a research
affiliate of the National Bureau of Economic Research.220 Michael J. Boskin and William G. Gale
Furthermore, record inflows of foreign investment in 1981 and 1984
were associated with a few huge corporate takeovers. Shell's purchase
of the publicly held shares of the U.S. subsidiary was, for instance,
probably not closely related to the phenomena we are interested in
isolating here. The fact that this paper confirms evidence drawn entirely
from the pre-1980s period is, while encouraging, quite a surprise.
In the analysis of U.S. direct investment abroad, several features of
the data should make one more cautious. First, as the authors indicate,
there are some definitional changes which are of uncertain impact.
More importantly, the nature of what is being measured may be quite
different from the fundamental decision to expand or contract foreign
operations, which I have emphasized in my previous work. One reason
is the growth and later decline in Netherlands Antilles financing affil-
iates. The U.S. withholding tax on capital returns paid to foreigners,
from which payments to the Netherlands Antilles were exempt by
treaty, resulted in the 1980s in subsidiaries in that region borrowing at
attractive Eurodollar rates and transferring funds to U.S. parent firms.
Such transfers, which appear in the U.S. international accounts as
negative investment in foreign subsidiaries, would be a mere curiosity,
except for their magnitude, which reached nearly $14 billion in 1982.
As table 6.2 indicates, this explains virtually the entire plunge in foreign
direct investment (DIA). While these flows are undoubtedly of impor-
tance, they are conceptually quite different from what we typically
think of as direct investment. With the repeal of the withholding tax
in 1984, borrowing abroad could be done directly, without showing up
in the direct investment figures. At this time, we are left with only a
return flow of interest payments through foreign subsidiaries, which
will continue to appear as positive direct investment until the loans are
repaid.
Of even more significance in research relating foreign investment to
foreign investment returns is the manner in which exchange rates are
reflected in the accounts. Table 6.7 indicates the magnitude of the
problem. Reinvested earnings are calculated by subtracting capital gains
and losses, as well as interest and dividend payments, from the income
of foreign affiliates. The reported income of foreign affiliates, likewise
excludes capital gains and losses, which mainly reflect the effects of
changes in the value of the dollar on the dollar value of foreign assets.
How (and even whether) exchange rate changes truly affect the value
of a firm's foreign operations is not a settled issue, and the magnitudes
of the accounting adjustments shown in table 6.7 are clearly disturbing.
As the value of the dollar surged, the negative foreign income and the
negative foreign reinvestment flows that were "created" became very
large relative to the "real flows." Thus, for instance, exchange rate
adjustments alone transformed a foreign income series from one whichoo *n ~* (s •—i <—i
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would have shown a robust recovery after the 1982 recession, into an
indicator of continuing stagnation abroad. Reported reinvested earn-
ings, on the other hand, did exhibit strong recovery after 1982, but
naturally not as strong as without the subtraction of dollar-related cap-
ital losses. More recent data, reflecting the plunge in the dollar, show
corresponding boosts in both investment abroad and earnings. A regres-
sion of reinvestment on rates of return during this unsettled period is
potentially quite problematic.
These difficulties again highlight the importance of my eclectic ap-
proach, which Boskin and Gale have followed, of fitting a variety of
equations: for foreign investment as a function of rates of return; for
the reinvestment ratio (with the currency effect incorporated in both
the numerator and denominator) as a function of rates of return; and
for foreign investment as a function of lagged rates of return.
While this litany of the limitations on our ability to reach concrete
conclusions seems discouraging, the fact of the matter is that the Boskin
and Gale results are quite consistent with the results I obtained using
data largely immune to these difficulties. The message that the data
seem intent on telling us is that U.S. taxes matter for the international
allocation of investment. The precise coefficients are of less importance
than this basic conclusion, given the long-standing tendency of policy-
makers to ignore the international implications of their decisions.
The domestic welfare effects of tax policy changes can easily be
overwhelmed by the international reallocation of capital, as we have
learned from a number of previous NBER studies. For this reason, it
is particularly important that we learn more about the nature of the
international flows of capital and their responsiveness to U.S. policy
changes. The success of future work will hinge on the availability of
better data. One possibility would be to focus on particular episodes
of major tax changes and investment flows between the United States
and a specific country, such as Canada or the U.K. Since tax policy
changes in both countries could easily be taken into account, a sharper
analysis of tax effects could be performed.
In any event, the issues are crucial, but the data problems are severe.
Nonetheless, the results reported here are a useful addition to our
knowledge on the topic.